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Abstract. According to the prevailing paradigm in social-cognitive neuroscience, the mental 
states of individuals become shared when they adapt to each other in the pursuit of a shared 
goal. We challenge this view by proposing an alternative approach to the cognitive foundations 
of social interactions. The central claim of this paper is that social cognition concerns the graded 
and dynamic process of alignment of individual minds, even in the absence of a shared goal. 
When individuals reciprocally exchange information about each other's minds processes of 
alignment unfold over time and across space, creating a social interaction. Not all cases of joint 
action involve such reciprocal exchange of information. To understand the nature of social 
interactions, then, we propose that attention should be focused on the manner in which people 
align words and thoughts, bodily postures and movements, in order to take one another into 
account and to make full use of socially relevant information.  
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
1. Introduction 
The study of how people to adjust minds and bodies during online interactions is central to 
understanding the nature and mechanisms of social cognition. In early studies of language use 
in dialogue, the processes of adjustment by which the participants in a conversation integrate 
and process partner-specific information were presented in terms of alignment (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004). The concept of alignment has since evolved and is used to describe the multi-
level, dynamic, and interactive mechanisms that underpin the sharing of people’s mental 
attitudes and representations in all kinds of social interactions (Dale, Fusaroli, & Duran 2013).  
The minds and bodies of people can be shared in several ways and, therefore, there are 																																																								1 Mattia.Gallotti@sas.ac.uk 
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different types of alignment. Alignment has recently been presented as a useful conceptual 
resource to frame the variety of functions and processes needed for mutual understanding as 
people (and their brains) exchange and process information in the course of interaction (Hasson 
& Frith, 2016; Stolk, Verhagen, & Toni, 2016). These functions range from low-level, action-
based and behavioural, forms of alignment of the kind observed when birds and fish move in 
perfect unison, to high-level processes involved in social judgment and evaluation. The 
underlying justification for subsuming all these cases under the same mechanism is that 
cognition and action cannot be separated. The sharing of minds and bodies can then be 
conceptualized in terms of an integrated system of alignment, defined as the dynamic coupling 
of behavioural and/or cognitive states of two people (Dumas, Laroche, & Lehmann, 2014).  
Sharing goals, commitments and intentions is a prime example of a situation associated with 
the alignment of mental and bodily resources leading to the formation of shared intentionality 
(Tollefsen & Dale, 2012). Specifically, by aligning at various levels of interaction, it is assumed 
that a change in the way the task is represented will follow and this is taken to indicate that a 
joint action is occurring (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). The question we try to probe 
here is whether the almost ubiquitous use of specific and well-tried experimental paradigms of 
joint action involving shared goals help or hinder a comprehensive description of social 
interaction. To answer this, we will explore the relation between joint action and alignment and 
its explanatory significance for thinking about the nature of social cognition. In detail, we 
suggest that focusing the study of the mechanisms and processes of alignment only on cases of 
goal-directed forms of joint action may be too narrow. Although we do not deny that the ability 
to adjust minds and bodies as it occurs in these interactions is perhaps the pinnacle of human 
sociality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), we are interested in the 
explanatory significance of alignment for a more general theory of social interaction, not in 
instrumental behaviour and/or alignment per se.  
People engage in interactions for a variety of reasons and in many different ways. For 
example, they might be enjoying the pleasure and smoothness of a social exchange even if there 
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is no common goal to be jointly pursued. Or else people might compete in socially relevant 
ways when their own goals diverge significantly. Acting together to achieve shared goals is 
only one of many situations in which the minds and bodies of individual people become shared 
in social interaction. We therefore propose a change of perspective that will have important 
theoretical consequences for what we deem to be social in nature. When the minds of at least 
two agents reciprocate thoughts and experiences in a certain manner - whether cooperative or 
competitive, pro-social or antagonistic - they have access to information relating to each other. 
The central claim of this paper is that it is the nature of the information exchange between 
interacting agents, rather than the fact that there is a shared goal to be jointly pursued, that sets 
the conditions for defining an interaction as social. Furthermore, from this perspective, not all 
forms of joint action in which the agents align will turn out to be social interactions. Focusing 
on processes of alignment will allow us to distinguish social cognitive activities that are 
reciprocal from those that are not.  
The central claim of this paper is that the alignment of minds, which emerges in social 
interactions, involves the reciprocal exchange of information whereby individuals adjust minds 
and bodies in a graded and dynamic manner. As these processes of alignment unfold, interacting 
partners will exchange information about each other’s minds and therefore act socially, whether 
or not a shared goal is in place. This view of sociality differs from the prevailing paradigm in 
social cognitive research with regard to the scope and explanatory significance of joint actions 
involving shared goals, although both views give pride of place to mental alignment.  
In section 2, we emphasize the importance of studying face-to-face social interactions in real 
time, but suggest that common, shared goals are not needed for mutual alignment to occur. In 
section 3 we suggest that the process of adjusting to one another reciprocally will not 
necessarily result in any degree of shared awareness, and that mutual alignment can occur even 
when task performance is not optimal. In section 4 we consider the information exchange that 
underlies the development of mutual alignment and show that not all cases of joint action lead 
to reciprocal information exchange and mutual alignment. In section 5 we conclude that 
 	 4 
reciprocal exchange of information leading to mutual adaptation should be the defining feature 
of social interactions.  
 
2. Shared goals and reciprocity 
For a long time, the study of social cognition was characterized by a focus on an individual 
mind operating in a social context (Brothers, 1990; C D Frith & Frith, 1999). Within the last 
decade, a major shift occurred which reflected the recognition that empirical studies must 
involve real time interactions between people (Frith, C. & Wolpert, D.M., 2004; Hutto 2004; 
Sebanz N., Knoblich G., 2003). Since then, research exploring the psychological mechanisms 
and neural correlates of social cognition has focused on forms of joint action where the 
participants achieve common goals as the key to understanding the processes whereby 
individuals exchange and integrate information in a manner that brings about a desired change 
in the environment. In the present discussion however, we suggest that the focus should instead 
be on the manner in which individuals interact rather than on shared goals as a principled 
component of joint action. 
Typically, the unfolding of a joint action is described as bringing about a change 
underpinned by a cognitive architecture involving representations, processes and smooth 
coordination (Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010). The representations of jointly 
interacting subjects are standardly made intelligible under a description of their intentions and 
motivations as expressing the disposition to pursue a common goal together. "Shared goals" has 
thus become the operational basis of shared representations in research on joint action and 
social cognition (Sacheli, Lucia M., Salvatore M. Aglioti, 2015). There are several reasons for 
taking shared goals to be the key to operationalizing joint action. Across science and 
philosophy, it is commonly assumed that sharing attitudes and resources is characteristic of 
partners interacting in a manner that is intentional and directed at common goals (Tomasello 
and Carpenter 2007(Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011). As such, many different kinds of joint action 
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are subsumed under the shared-goal umbrella, from cases of planned agency to cases of 
emergent and spontaneous interactions (Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). This wide range 
of possibilities reflects subtle differences between accounts of joint action.  
By and large, these differences can be traced back to two distinct approaches. Some accounts 
direct attention to the enactive dimension of sharing goals in joint action. Interacting partners 
must actively be doing something jointly for their minds to align, rather than merely observing 
interactions from a detached point of view (Schilbach et al., 2013). In other words, it is through 
doing, rather than what we intend to do, that interacting partners coordinate at various levels of 
interaction (Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2012). In contrast, for those who focus on the skills and 
motivations of individual agents for sharing intentions to act together, it is the joint character of 
the goals pursued by the agents that brings about the change in performance, determined by 
whether the task is performed alone or with someone else (Kourtis, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013; 
Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012). The differences between these approaches 
run deep, and it is not our intention to try to adjudicate the debate. Instead, we focus on what we 
take to be a minimal list of features for which there seems to be some consensus across the 
board (Bohl & van den Bos, 2012).  
In particular, in recent theoretical and empirical work on social cognition, reciprocity is 
increasingly recognized as a useful resource to capture the “jointness” of a joint action. 
Interpersonal understanding can be achieved by reading into one another's mind reciprocally 
(Butterfill, 2013), and an explanation of the processes whereby the alignment of minds and 
bodies unfolds in space and time should involve an account of reciprocity (Zahavi & Rochat, 
2015). In the process of a reciprocal exchange of information, individuals may adapt to varying 
degrees to one another. This is certainly the case in instances of temporal synchronization and 
coordination in which physical alignment in time and space has been theorized to depend on 
cognitive models of adaptation (Elliott, Chua, & Wing, 2016; Hayashi & Kondo, 2013; Repp & 
Su, 2013)(Repp and Su, 2013; Hayashi and Kondo, 2013; Elliott et al., 2016) and thus on 
reciprocal interactions (D’Ausilio, Novembre, Fadiga, & Keller, 2015; Keller, Novembre, & 
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Hove, 2014; Tognoli, E., & Kelso, 2015). The behavior of one player results in a change in 
behavior of the other in a reciprocal way so as to achieve temporal synchrony. Interestingly, 
though not surprisingly, this reciprocal exchange of information results in physical alignment, 
which in turn has also been shown to result in greater degrees of affiliation and greater mental 
alignment (Hove & Risen, 2009; Rabinowitch & Knafo-Noam, 2015; Wiltermuth & Heath, 
2009). Specifically, we suggest that, rather than a focus on the sharedness of the intended goal, 
we should attend to the graded exchange of information that creates alignment. The most social 
of interactions, in our formulation, are those in which “live” (“online”, see Schilbach, 2014b) 
information is exchanged dynamically (i.e. over time, across multiple points) bi-directionally 
and used to adapt behavior and align with another (Jasmin, K.M., McGettigan, C., Agnew, Z.K., 
Lavan, N., Josephs, O., Cummins, F. & Scott, 2016). However, as we will make clear later, not 
all “live” joint actions involve mutual and reciprocal adaptations. 
There is no doubt that many examples of shared interactions involve common goals and a 
certain degree of cooperation. In fact, joint actions are often implicitly construed as cooperative 
actions, i.e. actions initiated and sustained by common goals; the intentions, desires, wants, etc., 
of the agents to literally 'operate together'. However, social interactions are complex and 
diverse, and sometimes people adapt to each other even though they are not cooperating. 
Indeed, it is possible to have reciprocity and thus social interaction without cooperation. This 
would be the case, for example, in a competitive scenario in which the minds of the subjects are 
aligned at the appropriate level of description, and the sharing is essential to solve social 
dilemmas involving antagonistic behaviour (Bratman, 2014). In these exchanges, what is 
needed for the minds of the agents to attune to one another is that they adapt thoughts, bodily 
postures and movements, to take one another into account and reason as a team, even though the 
team might consist of competitive actors where none is aware that they are acting from the 
perspective of the same group and in the pursuit of some common goal (Bacharach, 2006). 
These are examples of social interactions without shared goals. 
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3. Shared awareness and optimal performance 
In the previous section, we identified paradigmatic features of joint action in the context of 
social cognition. While these features are often operationalized in terms of shared goals, their 
most fundamentally social nature has to do with the process whereby systems reciprocate 
thoughts and experiences, rather than with the endpoint i.e. the goal. It turns out that two 
features are often taken to be central to the process whereby interacting agents align minds and 
bodies. First, the interacting agents must be aware that they are doing something together with 
others. Second, the success of their joint performance is taken as a measure of how shared the 
participants’ goals are. In this section, we discuss each feature in detail and address issues 
which our view of reciprocity as the key to mental alignment can help to address.  
According to a venerable tradition in philosophy, agents act intentionally if they know what 
they are doing, in other words they are aware of their reasons to act the way they do 
(Anscombe, 1963). Just as individual actions are caused by reasons of which the individual is 
aware, so it follows that, when people engage in actions together, the target of their joint 
endeavors is known to each of them individually as theirs i.e. 'our goal'. Along similar lines, 
based on the terminology used as well as the intrinsic nature of the paradigms chosen, most 
empirical studies of social cognition are either testing or assuming that the agent represents the 
structure of the task, especially the goals, as joint. Multi-person activities are jointly performed 
in experimental settings in which the subjects follow instructions to work together. These are 
given either directly or indirectly in ways designed to urge the participants to join forces. For 
example, perception-action experiments in which co-acting individuals observe and respond to 
one another implicitly require each individual to be aware of, and to act according to their 
observations of the other as somebody jointly acting with them.  
There is currently a debate as to how to articulate the idea that jointly interacting agents must 
be aware of the 'jointness' of the task for the action to count as joint (Schmid, 2014; Zahavi, 
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2014). However, our suggestion is that what matters for the relevant alignment of minds and 
bodies to occur is the reciprocal exchange of information, not awareness of the reciprocal 
exchange of information. To be in a position to reciprocate pieces of information does not 
require that one take a reflective stance and think of oneself as someone who is involved in a 
joint action with others (i.e. awareness that 'we' are doing something together). If a system is 
adapting to another system reciprocally, it knows in some pre-reflective manner that it is 
adapting to that system, and the reciprocal adaptation over time makes it become aware that it is 
not alone in the world. This is the basis of research on social contingency in which the manner 
by which individuals become aware not only of self but of the “self” interacting with others. 
This is assumed to relying on reciprocal exchanges of information (Tarabulsy, G. M., Tessier, 
R., & Kappas, 1996; Trevarthen, 1979). Becoming mutually aware that we are sharing attitudes, 
dispositions, bodily postures, perhaps goals, does not mean that the 'jointness' of our actions has 
become available to each of us for conscious report. Reciprocity of awareness is emphatically 
not the same as awareness of reciprocity. The process of reciprocally exchanging information 
and mutually adapting to one another need not necessarily result in any degree of shared 
awareness.  
Some studies claim, not only that people perform better when they do things together, but 
also that task performance improves towards a point of optimality (Bahrami et al., 2012). There 
is evidence that, with the adoption of appropriate strategies, joint performance can be 
maximized and can approach an optimum in terms of full use of the information potentially 
available to the group. For example, knowing the noise associated with the signal for each 
individual, we can estimate how much the noise should be reduced when signals are optimally 
combined (Bahrami et al., 2010). In animals, a signal, for example about the source of food, that 
is too weak for an individual fish to follow can be followed by a group through the simple rules 
of bodily alignment that create shoaling behavior (Grunbaum, 1998). Shoaling behaviour can 
also be observed in humans (Belz, Pyritz, & Boos, 2013), who can achieve group advantage 
through more complex forms of adjustment than just bodily alignment. Pairs of participants 
 	 9 
trying to detect a weak visual signal can achieve a greater group advantage when they align the 
terms they use to report their confidence in what they saw (Fusaroli et al., 2012). Indeed, 
linguistic alignment at many levels can be observed in dialogue (Pickering & Garrod, 2004) and 
can improve comprehension (Adank, Hagoort, & Bekkering, 2010; Fusaroli et al., 2012).  
But is optimal performance necessary for mental alignment and social interaction? Although 
doing something together allows for some advantage, this advantage need not necessarily lead 
to optimal task performance. There are two problems that need to be considered. First, the 
interacting partners may not be maximizing what the experimenters had in mind. For example, 
rather than maximizing task accuracy, they might be maximizing the pleasure and smoothness 
of the social interaction by taking the advice of their partner even when this was not ideal. 
While this latter strategy might not be optimum for the task in hand, it might well be optimal for 
future interactions with a range of different tasks (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Second, there are 
many cases where the (reciprocal) alignment does not necessarily lead to optimal performance. 
There is an automatic tendency to imitate the actions of the other (Cook, Bird, Lunser, Huck, & 
Heyes, 2012), which has to be suppressed in joint action tasks that require participants to make 
complimentary rather than congruent movements (van Schie & van Waterschoot, B. M. 
Bekkering, 2008). Here basic bodily alignment can interfere with successful joint action. There 
are also circumstances where more complex forms of alignment can interfere with successful 
joint action. If the members of a pair differ in the ability critical to the task being performed, 
joint performance may lead to a sub-optimal performance. This effect is due to inappropriate 
alignment of estimates of the relative competence of the members of the group (Mahmoodi et 
al., 2015). This alignment optimizes performance if they have equal ability, but if their ability is 
different this alignment over-weights the incompetent one and under-weights the competent 
one. These examples show that alignment can prevent the achievement of optimal performance 
and, conversely, that to achieve optimal performance alignment must sometimes be suppressed.  
Much research has been driven, so far, by the implicit goal of identifying optimal group 
performance as a proxy for mental alignment (Fusaroli et al., 2012), however, there is 
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conceptual room and empirical evidence for arguing that optimal task performance is not a good 
index of mental alignment or ‘optimal sociality’. In other words, taking achievement of a shared 
goal as the paradigm of a genuinely social interaction leads to the binary conception of sociality 
according to which an interaction is either (optimally) social, or it is not. Instead we should be 
investigating the nature of the corresponding state. In the next section, we will suggest a 
different definition of social interaction. This approach takes alignment to refer to the process 
by which systems exchange information by adjusting bodily and mental states dynamically to 
varying degrees.  
 
4. Types of alignment 
Two systems can interact when they have access to information relating to each other (Bilek 
et al., 2015). There are different ways of exchanging information between systems and hence 
different types of interaction (Liu & Pelowski, 2014), but in every case some kind of alignment 
occurs (Coey, Varlet, & Richardson, 2012; Huygens, 1673). In the previous sections we have 
analysed the prevailing paradigms in research on social cognition, showing how the implicit 
assumptions underlying current theoretical and empirical studies of joint action imply a certain 
picture of the nature and mechanism of social interactions. In this section we propose an 
alternative approach to research on the cognitive foundations of sociality and are particularly 
concerned with the characterisation of alignment. On the premise that social interaction occurs 
when people align their mental attitudes and bodily postures at various levels of coordination, 
then different types of interaction can be classified in terms of types of alignment. In order to 
motivate our discussion of the way in which social interaction should be empirically 
investigated and theorized about, we will pay particular attention to the requirement for 
reciprocity. 
In section 2 we pointed out that it has become customary in the literature to consider shared 
goals as the paradigm case of social interaction and to identify reciprocity as an important 
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consequence of joint action (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). In contrast to this approach we will 
take reciprocity to be the primary requirement for social interactions. We suggest that 
reciprocity can be identified with a special kind of alignment, mutual alignment, involving 
adjustment in both parties to the interaction. However, not all cases of joint action lead to 
mutual alignment. It is important to distinguish this mutual alignment from other types of 
alignment, which do not involve a reciprocal exchange of information between the agents. Such 
types are characteristic of many previous studies of social cognition in which participants were 
frequently tested in the context of observational, ‘offline’ social interactions. For example, there 
have been many studies in which behaviour and brain activity were measured when one 
participant observed the actions of another (Iacoboni et al., 2004). Such offline social cognition 
involves interaction between two systems, an actor and an observer. However, while one system 
(the observer) can align with the actor, the other system (the actor) cannot align with the 
observer, since the actor receives no information about the observer (see figure 1). The 
exchange of information goes in one direction only. There is alignment, even in an 
observational scenario, but it is not mutual. This justifies the critique that the social cognition in 
observational scenarios is not sufficiently ‘social’ since it amounts to individual-level cognitive 
processes tested in a social setting (Hutto, 2004).  
    
Figure 1 
Such offline interaction can be contrasted with the case of online social interactions, where 
both participants act. The distinction between offline and online social interaction tasks is now 
acknowledged as crucial for advancing our understanding of the cognition processes underlying 
social interaction (Schilbach, 2014a). However, not every case of online interaction involves a 
genuinely reciprocal social interaction based on mutual alignment. There are tasks where 
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adjustment of the minds and bodies of participants are linked, but not by the reciprocal 
exchange of information. Consider, for example, the case of salsa. Salsa is indeed a case of joint 
action. The participants engage in a common task where they have to accomplish something 
together by coordinating their behaviour, and by cooperating in the pursuit of the shared goal, 
i.e. performing the dance. In salsa, dancers interact by performing a series of predefined 
movement patterns (Renta, 2004). As a result, coordination relies primarily on synchronization 
with the music, rather than adaptation to each other (Koehne et al., 2015). As such, figure 2 
shows, there need be no binary exchange of information of the kind required by cases of mutual 
alignment. In other words, the participants do not rely on each other because they rely instead 
on information from a third system, i.e. music with a predictable pulse2 . If each actor 
coordinates with the predictable pulse dictated by the music, then they will become temporally 
aligned. Although temporal coordination does create a degree of alignment between the agents, 
it does not amount to a mutual exchange of information. Notice that the explanatory advantage 
of defining the type of interaction involved in salsa from the point of view of what is required 
for the agents to adjust, at various levels of interaction, is to shed light on minimal aspects of 
sociality that would otherwise be left out of a joint-action picture of social interaction.  
    
Figure 2 
Indeed, if the music were heard by one of the actors, while the second actor only had access 
to the behaviour of the first actor, this would be a case of offline social cognition. Here the first 																																																								2	We admit that this is a rather idealist view of Salsa. In ‘real life’ partners no doubt do adapt to each 
other’s movements.	
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actor becomes the leader while the second actor is the follower. Leader and follower are still 
doing something together as the synchronization task requires the subjects to adjust 
behaviourally to each other. But although the agents interact as if they were cooperating and 
synchronizing, the adjustment only appears so from an observer’s point of view. It should be 
emphasized that the leader receives no information from the follower hence there is no 
reciprocal interaction (see figure 3).  
   
Figure 3 
Notice that we are not saying that synchronization tasks are not reciprocal in nature. Quite 
the opposite, they could well be. Rather, the point is that, although the literature has now moved 
towards a more interactionist approach, empirical studies continue to be limited to tasks that 
require agents to interact together in time in the pursuit of joint goals. Since behavioural 
synchronization is typically observed in such studies, there is a tendency to argue that the task 
being undertaken – in the present discussion, an online task of synchronization – is sufficient to 
capture the socially relevant component of a social interaction. We contend that, if we want a 
richer and more exhaustive account of sociality, then observation of synchronized behaviour is 
not sufficient, or necessary, to define social interaction. It is the nature of the exchange of 
information, whatever this nature may be, that sets the conditions for the individuation of an 
interaction as social.  
The change of perspective prompted by our definition of social interaction suggests that 
reciprocity may be necessary though not sufficient to define the nature of online social 
cognition. If the exchange of information between two systems is bidirectional, then the 
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interaction is likely to be reciprocal and dynamic (figure 4).  In contrast to salsa, consider the 
case of tango in which movements are improvised and as such require constant, mutual 
adaptation (Koehne et al., 2015; Tateo, 2014). Tango dancers have access to information 
relating to each other and, by virtue of the task, they exchange information with one another 
across time in a reciprocal and bidirectional fashion. The juxtaposition of tango with salsa 
highlights a spectrum of degrees of mutual reciprocity, with a richer form of interaction and 
greater need for alignment in tango compared with salsa. 
   
Figure 4 
We will explain what we mean by reciprocity with an example concerning the division of 
labour and the degree of give-and-take that can occur within an interacting partnership. In any 
exchange, one can expect that, due to individual differences, such as differences in skill or 
personality, co-actors may choose different roles within the interaction. Consider the very 
simple task in which two partners hear a rhythm and then have to continue this rhythm, without 
an external signal, by tapping together in synchrony. Although very simple, this task has two 
components, first, to maintain the rhythm and, second, to stay in synchrony. When this task is 
performed, a division of labour develops spontaneously. One partner concentrates on 
maintaining the rhythm, while the other concentrates on keeping in synchrony (Konvalinka et 
al., 2014; Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010). In this example the second partner 
must adapt more than the first and, in this sense becomes a follower, while the first becomes a 
leader (illustrated by the thickness of the arrows in figure 5). In such cases there will be a degree 
of give and take that not only varies across individuals but may also vary across time. For 
example, a follower will adapt more or less depending on the variability of the signal from the 
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leader (Fairhurst, Janata, & Keller, 2013). Another example is where one partner in a joint 
action will take up a follower role when the other partner has a more difficult task to perform 
(Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich & Sebanz, 2013). 
. 
 
   
Figure 5 
This suggests that a binary, in-or-out view of synchronised behaviour will almost certainly 
miss interesting information relating to the precise nature of the exchange and interdependence 
of the two signals. An interaction is not about discreet points of, for example, synchronization 
or coordination in space and time, but rather it is about the dynamic process of alignment that 
leads to those observed behaviours that we deem social in nature. Perhaps the degree of 
synchronization achieved in a rhythmical joint action task is less important than the exchange 
that allowed this synchronisation to occur. It is the predictive and adaptive behaviours of the 
interacting partners that allows, not only for greater physical coordination, but also for mental 
alignment.  
Future experimental work should aim to explore the nature of the exchange. This could be 
achieved by modelling the dynamic time-course of both behavioural (e.g. tapping behaviour and 
other measures of temporal coordination) and neural activity of the interacting individuals. This 
would take us beyond binary correlations and simple comparisons of being in or out of 
synchrony. In particular, it will be important to consider the kind if synchronisation of 
behaviour and neural activity that occurs when partners mutually adapt and to contrast this with 
that occurring when partners are being driven by the same external signal without mutual 
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exchange of infomration. We might also expect to see a spectrum of synchronisation forms 
relating to the extent to which leader-follower distinctions emerge. 
As we said earlier, the consensus view is that reciprocity is a necessary condition for 
sociality in the sense of a joint action. By stressing the importance of the nature of the exchange 
of information, we are not challenging this consensus view. We agree that some social 
interactions must be reciprocal and involve a mutual exchange of information. Our claim is that 
the type of social interaction at stake at any given time depends on the nature of the exchange of 
information rather than the fact that the subjects might be engaged in performing joint action 
tasks. By thinking about the conditions for the formation and persistence of acts of sociality in 
terms of the nature of information exchange, we can generate a definition of social interaction 
that is simpler yet more encompassing than the picture painted by the prevailing paradigm.  
The moral is that focusing on online tasks that appear social if not mutual from an outside 
point of view leads to a limited definition of what counts as truly social in a social interaction. 
This is the case even though they involve subjects who are, more or less explicitly, instructed to 
undertake actions together in the pursuit of shared goals. In contrast, focus on the types of 
information exchange between agents during a social interaction allows for a broader range of 
interactions to be considered. A bi-directional and mutual exchange of information can be seen 
as the pinnacle of social interaction. But such interactions are not exclusive to joint actions 
where participants have a common goal. There are more ways for individual people to 
reciprocate thoughts and experiences than acting together in the pursuit of joint goals. 
Furthermore, not all joint actions elicit the bidirectional and mutual exchange of information. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The biggest challenge currently facing philosophers and scientists of social cognition is to 
understand social interactions. We suggest that this problem is best approached at the level of 
processes of mental alignment rather than through joint action tasks based on shared goals, and 
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we propose that the key process is one of reciprocal, dynamic and graded adaptation between 
the participants in the interaction. Defining social interactions in terms of reciprocal patterns of 
alignment shows that not all joint actions involve reciprocity and also that social interactions 
can occur in the absence of shared goals. This approach has two particular advantages. First, it 
emphasises the key point that interactions can only be fully understood at the level of the group, 
rather than the individual. The pooling together of individual mental resources generates results 
that exceed the sum of the individual contributions. But, second, our approach points towards 
the mechanisms of adaptation that must be occurring within each individual in order to create 
the interaction (Friston & Frith, 2015). 
This picture of social interaction in terms of mental alignment suggests two important 
theoretical developments. One is about a possible way to characterize the idea that types of 
social interaction lie on a continuum of possible solutions. If we focus on the task or the shared 
goal being pursued by agents jointly, as the current literature suggests, then only limited sub-
divisions of types of interaction will emerge. If, however, our focus extends so as to integrate 
the nature of the interaction, conceived of in terms of information exchange, then we can arrive 
at a higher degree of resolution of the space in which social interaction lie. This will define a 
spectrum of types of interaction (not just offline versus online social cognition), suggesting a 
dimensional rather than a discrete picture. After all, alignment comes in degrees and a 
spectrum-like definition of sociality implies that there is a variety of forms of alignment and 
hence of interactions. The lesson is that interacting socially is a matter of ‘less or more’ social 
understanding, rather than a binary i.e. all-or-none scenario.  
The second theoretical consequence of our model follows directly from this view of the 
graded nature of mental alignment and concerns the definition of what counts as social in a 
social interaction. We leave aside any consideration of the specific task involved and 
concentrate solely on the nature of the interaction and the extent to which it is dynamic. The key 
feature of this definition is that people engaged in a social interaction exchange information 
dynamically, through give-and-take, and not that they must entertain representational states of a 
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certain type3 allowing them to share plans and goals, as the prevailing definition of a social 
interaction in terms of shared intentionality would have it. By doing so, we avoid making 
assumptions about the representational configuration of the intentional states that enable and 
sustain acts of interaction. Of course, this hardly amounts to rejection of representationalism, or 
any classic assumption in social-cognitive research about the conditions of existence and 
identity of mental states. The point is rather that we can articulate a view of sociality that does 
not necessarily involve appeal to assumptions about the shared nature of individual-level mental 
states, which have proven difficult to articulate and operationalize beyond intuition. 
We believe that this approach opens up exciting possibilities for new experimental 
paradigms, outlined in the previous section, and also for theoretical reflection on the nature of 
the social mind. 
 
  
																																																								3 This should be understood loosely as referring to both the intentional type and the content of mental 
representations, as well as to the psychological ‘mode’ in which they are entertained by the parties to a 
social interaction, for example the second or the first-person plural.  
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